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THE EU AND ITS POLICY TOWARDS SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM: A NEW EXAMPLE OF THE ‘CONCEPTUAL-
CONTEXTUAL’ DIVIDE?
F irst introduced into the public domain by the UK Labour govern-ment following its electoral victory in 1997, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a relatively recent concept.1 The often cited 1998 speech 
by former UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare 
Short, at the Royal College of Defence Studies (London) has become a 
symbol of the key role that the UK played in developing this concept, 
but also a clear indication of how new this concept is. Short called for 
“a partnership between the development community and the military” 
to address the “inter-related issues of security, development and conflict 
prevention”.2 Her statement effectively parted from the type of military 
assistance and defence cooperation – often referred to as “old defence 
diplomacy” – that characterised the eras of European colonialism and the 
Cold War. That is, technical assistance aimed at strengthening the armed 
and security forces of allied countries without consideration for the gov-
ernance aspect, including the democratic accountability of those forces.3 
As a field of study and practice, the development of SSR has been influ-
enced by a number of trends. These include the re-thinking process of 
Cold War-related security concepts in favour of people-centred defini-
tions that went on since the late 1980s in Africa, Asia and Latin America; 
the “new wars” of the 1990s, to use Mary Kaldor’s terminology; and, 
more recently, the aftermath of 11 September 2001.4 Consequently, at 
present, SSR has links to a multitude of pressing problems, from poverty 
alleviation to sustainable development, good governance and conflict 
mitigation/resolution.5 SSR has widened its scope from an initial narrow 
focus on the defence sector to include other security agents as well as 
issues related to justice; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR); and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 
Due to the changes in the nature and scope of SSR, the concept occupies 
an important role within the policy agenda of key international actors, 
from individual states (like the UK and the Netherlands) that have devel-
oped specific SSR policies or comprehensive governmental approaches, 
to international institutions such as the OECD, the UN and the EU. The 
latter two have in recent years moved a step further by producing policy 
concepts that institutionalise their efforts in this field in search for more 
coherence, comprehensiveness and coordination. Even the World Bank 
has succumbed, albeit more timidly than other institutions, to the need 
to incorporate security-related policies. 
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The present chapter is located within the study of institutional responses 
to the multidimensional nature of SSR. It will provide an analysis of the 
EU’s efforts to improve its performance in this field by focusing on its 
two recent policy concept papers. It will highlight the main traits and 
synergies of the documents, using the example of police assistance as an 
illustration of the Union’s readiness to engage actively in the field of SSR. 
In doing so this article engages with those scholars who point out that 
“a ‘conceptual-contextual divide’ exists between SSR’s stated goals and 
its actual implementation”.6
EU Concepts on SSR: What, Where, When? 
There are two EU documents on SSR, the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support 
to Security Sector Reform (henceforth ‘Council SSR Concept’) and the 2006 
A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform 
(henceforth ‘Commission SSR Concept’). As explained later in the chapter, 
these documents were brought together under a common policy framework 
in 2006. These two SSR concepts build on various EU reference documents, 
including the European Security Strategy that advocates a Union ready to 
engage in a larger variety of missions. Moreover, security sector reform, 
within a broader institution-building approach, is mentioned in the strategy 
document as one of the possible approaches to fulfil EU objectives, including 
preventing and/or resolving violent conflict, combating terrorism and address-
ing state fragility. A similar message can be found in the Civilian Headline 
Goal 2008 document, endorsed at the December 2004 European Council. 
It calls for going beyond Petersberg-type missions to include, among other 
things, support to SSR and DDR.7 
The Council and Commission SSR concepts also build on their previous efforts 
in this field. For example, at a strategic level, in 2004 both the European 
Commission and a number of EU Member States were heavily engaged in 
the development of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
Security System Reform and Governance guidelines (due at least in part to 
their membership of this committee). At an operational level, the Union 
through both its Council and Commission mechanisms has already been 
engaged for a number of years in the implementation of various aspects of 
SSR. For example, the Commission has provided SSR-related support in over 
70 countries, through both its geographical and thematic programmes, from 
Eastern Europe to North and South Caucasus and Central Asia, Western 
Balkans, Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific, South Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, Latin America and Asia. The support provided so far has fallen 
in the areas of reform of law enforcement, justice, and state institutions deal-
ing with the management and oversight of security agents. Other activities 
have been directly linked to the respect for human rights which, in the words 
of the Commission, “also encompass the security sector and thus indirectly 
contribute to security sector reform”.8 Furthermore, some of the Commission 
activities have in the past sought to strengthen regional approaches to secu-
rity, which “also has a positive impact on SSR efforts at the national level”.9 
The Council has focused more on deploying civilian and military missions 
within the framework of its ESDP, beginning in January 2003 with the 
European Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, until 2005 
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none of these missions were meant to address SSR as a whole, but rath-
er specific aspects of the security sector, such as purely military issues, 
civil-military relations, police reform, rule of law and border manage-
ment.10 The EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has broken with this pattern. This 
mission has engaged in army reintegration and reform, advice to secu-
rity authorities on good governance and, at times, in aspects related to 
police and customs reform, leading to some overlap with the EU Police 
Mission in Kinshasa (April 2005-June 2007).11 A new SSR mission is being 
planned in Guinea Bissau, expected to be deployed in spring 2008. 
The existing evidence of Council and Commission involvement in SSR-
related activities seems to illustrate that the EU is not entirely new to this 
field. However, there are some critics who argue that the operational 
activities listed by the Council and Commission documents as evidence 
of their experience require a more critical assessment as many have been 
re-labelled to fall under SSR.12 Leaving this issue aside, what makes the 
two EU concept papers on SSR different is their emphasis on providing 
the Union with a coherent and holistic/integrated approach that did not 
exist before. According to a Council official, “the SSR concept is not 
‘new’ in itself […] many Member States have done bits of SSR before 
[…] the only thing that is new is the idea that SSR-related work has to 
be holistic”.13 In order to achieve this comprehensiveness, the two SSR 
concepts have sought to provide the basis for successful coordination 
between the EU Pillars while also ensuring “one common understanding 
on SSR among the 27 Member States”.14 
The Council and Commission SSR concepts adopt by and large the OECD 
DAC guidelines as the starting point, which define the security sector as:15 
A system which includes:
•	 The core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramili-
tary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both 
military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; custom authorities; 
reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, 
militias).
•	 Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national 
security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committee; 
ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and 
traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance min-
istries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units) and civil 
society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints 
commissions).
•	 Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; 
prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice sys-
tems.
•	 Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage: libera-
tion armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguards units; private security 
companies; political party militias.16
Both documents highlight the importance of ensuring and/or strengthen-
ing the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector 
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when dealing with external and internal security needs, the civilian con-
trol of security actors, the protection of democratic norms and principles 
of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law. 
They also acknowledge the importance of local ownership and tailored 
approaches that can ensure that the EU’s support to SSR is the most 
adequate to the needs of the local population, the country and region. 
Africa seems to have been in the mind of the Council and Commission 
officials involved in the drafting process of the two SSR documents for a 
variety of reasons: (1) historical factors, particularly for countries like the 
UK and France; (2) existing strong links between Africa and the EU and 
its close proximity to the Union; (3) the pressing conflict-related prob-
lems this continent is going through and the effects these have within 
the EU in the form of human and drug trafficking, and illegal immigra-
tion. However, this does not mean that the two concepts were created 
for implementation in Africa alone. On the contrary, the intention was 
to create a general tool that the EU could use in a variety of contexts 
worldwide. In fact, when put together, the two documents identify a 
number of possible scenarios for EU action on behalf of SSR, ranging 
from an immediate post-conflict situation to a context where countries 
are undergoing long-term democratisation processes in relatively stable 
environments. The two SSR documents acknowledge that each sce-
nario comes with its own set of needs and combination of Council and 
Commission action. Within this framework the southern Mediterranean 
countries and the Western Balkans are two other regions well-suited 
to receive EU assistance in the field of SSR.17 These two regions are 
appealing to the EU for they fall within the Union’s enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies and consequently, the state of their security sec-
tors arguably has a bearing on the EU’s internal security needs. 
EU Concepts on SSR: How and by Whom? 
The two SSR concepts endorse the OECD’s call for a holistic, multi-sec-
toral approach that seeks to find linkages between existing local security 
actors when carrying out reform activities, rather than concentrating on 
one or a very limited number of actors, often independent of each other, 
as previous donor actions have tended to do. This search for compre-
hensiveness goes further in the EU case considering that the Council 
document calls for the integration of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) activities within a SSR approach.
It has been noted that DDR can constitute a significant pillar of SSR 
and is regarded as central to conflict resolution and internal stability. 
In such cases, SSR will call for DDR-type activities. However, SSR goes 
well beyond DDR and should be considered as the primary concept; 
DDR should be addressed separately, but consistently with this SSR 
concept, noting that the Commission is particularly active in the field of 
Reintegration.18 
The importance of this relationship was similarly underlined in the 2006 
EU Concept on DDR, where it was underlined that any DDR process 
“should be considered an aspect of Security Sector Reform and take its 
point of departure from an assessment of future needs and structures 
157 GEMMA COLLANTES CELADOR
•
The Civilian Headline 
Goal 2008 document 
has provided the EU 
with guidelines for the 
enhancement of civilian 
crisis management 
capabilities
of the overall security system, recognising at the same time that parts of 
DDR go outside SSR”.19 The EU has been involved in DDR activities for a 
long time, mainly through Commission actions and Member States’ bilat-
eral programmes. This track record was reinforced in 2005 by the ESDP 
Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, deployed to monitor the disarma-
ment of members of the former resistance movement (GAM) and the 
phased withdrawal of Indonesian government troops. 
The Council and Commission SSR documents also specify the kind of 
support the EU could offer in particular areas, including military reform, 
police reform, justice and rule of law, border and custom sector, financial 
and budgetary reform of the security sector, and government functioning 
and division of responsibilities. Let’s take the example of police reform. 
The Council document specifies that, The EU could, inter alia, provide 
assistance in the following domains:
•	 assessment of policing needs;
•	 defining the objectives of a comprehensive policing policy and strategy, 
fully integrated with the objectives of the Justice/Rule of Law sector;
•	 developing a methodology for achieving such objectives, including 
critical and success factors and their measurement;
•	 organising the police sector, including oversight/budget control;
•	 administration, transparency and accountability, as well as political 
control;
•	 educating the police sector on the principles of modern policing and 
police management, including respect for human rights, international 
law, and gender issues;
•	 guiding and accompanying the police force in their daily tasks during a 
transitional period;
•	 co-locating experts to the national ministry of home affairs to monitor, 
mentor and advise local authorities in issues related to home affairs 
and SSR;
•	 launching public awareness campaigns in order to secure the trust and 
co-operation of the community.20
In order to realise this police assistance the Council has at its disposal 
a variety of mechanisms developed since the late 1990s. At the 2000 
Santa Maria da Feira meeting, EU Member States approved police action 
as a priority area, in addition to the rule of law, civilian administration, 
and civilian protection. Furthermore, it was concluded that by 2003 EU 
Member States should voluntarily contribute up to 5,000 police officers 
for international missions across the full range of conflict prevention and 
crisis management operations, up to 1,000 of them deployable within 
30 days if necessary. Since then, these police targets have been met and 
increased. Moreover, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 document has 
provided the EU with guidelines for the enhancement of civilian crisis 
management capabilities, both in terms of capabilities and possible sce-
narios for their deployment.21 This has allowed for progress in Member 
States’ contribution, for example, of specialists in the fields of border 
police, sexual and violent crime, human trafficking, organised crime and 
human rights as well as in the development of Civilian Response Teams, 
Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units. These developments are 
now complemented with a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010, adopted 
during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU (July-December 2007). Based 
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on the assumption that the commitments made in the Civilian Headline 
Goal 2008 have been met, this new document gives more weight to 
questions of quality over quantity of the capabilities.22 The building of the 
EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities has so far taken place concur-
rently with a similar exercise – commenced earlier – to build a military 
crisis management capability.
The process of fleshing out the EU’s role in police assistance has also 
been accompanied by the creation of a number of structures and plans, 
including the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, 
the Police Unit in the Council Secretariat, and the Police Action Plan to 
foster consistency within the EU and with other external actors.23 More 
recently, the EU Council of Ministers agreed on a reorganisation of the 
Council Secretariat to better serve the needs of civilian ESDP operations, 
including those of a police nature. The end result – the establishment of 
a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – will complement 
the “new” civilian crisis management directorate (DGE IX) in the Council 
Secretariat. The latter, following its restructuring, will deal with the politi-
cal-civilian (pol-civ) side of crisis management, such as the preparation of 
the crisis management concept.24 It will nevertheless continue to manage 
horizontal issues related to civilian ESDP, including concepts, capabilities 
and training.25 Note that none of these capabilities and structures was 
created to serve SSR activities, but rather for crisis management more 
generally. However, with the consent of Member States they could also 
be applied to missions of this kind. 
Turning now to the Commission, it can contribute directly to the promo-
tion of the governance aspects of police reform/assistance, including 
democratic control and civilian oversight, police-judicial relations, inde-
pendence from politicisation, civil society assistance, efficient use of 
public resources, respect for human rights and capacity-building of 
regional and/or sub-regional organisations to deal efficiently with the 
regional dimensions of SSR (including police aspects). There are in fact 
various well-established Community policies and financial instruments 
that have been used and could be used in the future. These include 
Short-Term instruments (such as the Stability instrument administered by 
the DG External Relations) and those that fall under Development and 
Economic Cooperation, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Policy, the Pre-Accession Assistance instrument, the Enlargement proc-
ess (including twinning programmes), and the Democracy and Human 
Rights, and Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management policies.26 
Moreover, there is also the external dimension of policies related to the 
area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
However, as outlined by the Commission document, the tools at its 
disposal could be better employed. For example, SSR (including police 
reform/assistance) should be prioritised under the aforesaid policies 
and financial instruments, as well as clearly integrated in Country and 
Regional Strategy Papers, and action plans programming tools. For the 
latter proposal to take place it would depend, at least partly, on good 
coordination with Member States bilateral country strategy papers. Other 
proposals under consideration include working towards effective and 
holistic policy and programming dialogue with stakeholders in partner 
countries by introducing international standards on SSR, ensuring coordi-
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nated planning (as has begun to take place through Council-Commission 
fact-finding missions), expanding and improving the range of expertise 
and pool of experts, designing SSR-specific training, and improving 
cooperation with international partners.27 For its part, the Council SSR 
document suggests that since SSR has to be locally owned, national 
development plans in areas such as poverty reduction should also be 
taken into account.28
The authors of the Council SSR document realise that reforming the 
security sector is a horizontal process that encompasses elements 
that cannot be tackled using crisis management instruments alone. 
Consequently, the document calls for complementarity with other areas 
of EU external action: 
In any situation, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission 
will need to work in close cooperation both to ensure a clear, func-
tional division of responsibilities and to ensure maximum coherence 
and effectiveness of overall EU effort. It is foreseen that the paper on a 
Community concept on SSR will build on the same premise.29 
And indeed it does. The Commission SSR document calls for coher-
ence not only with ESDP missions but also with the bilateral activities of 
certain EU Member States. It also mentions the need for better coop-
eration at a multilateral level in order to ensure greater levels of synergy 
and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication, not only within the UN 
framework, but also with third states, other international organisations, 
and NGOs. An example of this search for coordination is the work that 
the Commission has carried out within the OECD DAC framework to 
develop, together with some EU Member States and other bilateral and 
multilateral donors, the 2007 joint donor handbook for SSR implementa-
tion.30 This document provides donors with a set of common guidelines 
in areas such as SSR assessment methodology, programme design, man-
agement and evaluation, and development of integrated approaches, 
that allow for a better management and linkages between development, 
security and justice policies and practices. The end goal of this donor 
handbook is to achieve greater levels of efficiency, coherence, sustaina-
bility and adequacy to people’s needs in the implementation of the 2004 
OECD DAC Security System Reform and Governance guidelines.31 
EU Concepts on SSR: Problems
There is some scepticism as to the viability of the EU’s search for holism 
and coherence in its SSR activities. This arises from a number of problems 
that appeared during the policy formulation phase, and that cast a shadow 
on its implementation. The EU did not proceed to merge the Council and 
Commission documents into one overall SSR concept, as originally intended. 
As stated in the Council document, “due consideration should be given to 
joining these two strands within the framework of an overarching EU concept 
for SSR”.32 This was initially thought to be of as necessary since, as the titles 
specify, both the Council and Commission documents on SSR were drafted 
to show what each institution could contribute to an SSR process, with the 
Commission document presented as a “Communication”.33 Nevertheless, it 
was decided to discard this original idea and instead bring the two concepts 
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under a common framework in June 2006. This common policy framework 
highlights the need to take a comprehensive, cross-pillar approach to SSR 
that subsequent Presidencies and the Commission would gradually turn into 
operational actions for Community and ESDP action.
There are various explanations for this change of plans. As elucidated by 
a senior Council official, “For outsiders one common concept would have 
been better but too time-consuming and Austria wanted to complete 
this job before the end of its Presidency”.34 The drafting of the two SSR 
concepts took a total of eight months, with the Commission document 
taking the longest due to the fact that all country and thematic desks 
had to be consulted. Therefore, according to this Council official, 
developing a common document on the basis of these two would have 
taken too long at a time when the Austrian Presidency was determined 
to finish the process began by the UK. A Commission official, however, 
provided a different view on this change of events:
Given the range of policy instruments used to support SSR and the different 
nature of community programmes and ESDP activities we have not seen the 
need to try to revise these and come up with a single document. Instead, 
we are focusing on implementation and how to achieve better coherence in 
situations like DRC, Kosovo and Afghanistan, etc.35
Regardless of how reasonable this point of view sounds, the fact is that 
the absence of a single document on SSR reinforces the view held by 
many scholars and practitioners that coordination and collaboration 
between the Council and Commission is still sub-optimal. 
Concerning internal EU cooperation, one should also add to the 
aforesaid institutional equation the need to cooperate with the national 
policies of those Member States active in the SSR field, and to ensure 
better civil-military relations, which remain two areas with too many 
open questions. Some of the challenges confronting the EU with regards 
to its relations with Member States are eloquently summed up by a 
Council official, who remarked that, 
'SSR is still very young. It has the possibility of becoming something ‘nice’ 
if we are able to manage it all in a coherent way, if Member States are 
keen to cooperate, if they are willing to give the necessary capabilities 
to the EU […] for the time being it is not so evident […] so far there is 
no transparency of Member States with the EU on what each of them is 
doing in terms of SSR programmes in different countries'.36 
The drafting of the 2006 DDR Concept provides the opposite picture. 
The various EU-related stakeholders involved (including Member States) 
were ready, in the words of a Commission official, to “break the 
existing institutional set up to acknowledge the security-development 
nexus” leading to the Commission and Council working together in the 
drafting of one single concept.37 This ‘success’ story could nevertheless 
be explained by the narrower field of action, the smaller number of EU 
actors involved, and the fewer locations of EU action. 
The problems of internal cooperation and coordination could somehow be 
offset by a successful implementation of the SSR documents. In this respect, 
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one can already point at some positive initiatives. For example, the develop-
ment of joint Commission-Council-Member States fact-finding missions, the 
awareness-raising campaign by EuropeAid among other Directorate Generals 
and EC Delegations to speed the information-sharing process on best prac-
tices, and the Commission’s participation in the drafting of the OECD DAC 
2007 Handbook on SSR. However, these moves are timid steps if the EU is to 
confront those sceptics that continue to view the SSR documents as another 
“paper tiger” that will be lost and forgotten in the maze of documents pro-
duced by the EU.38 Indeed, there is an array of potential challenges that the EU 
needs to tackle. These include further work on the development of regional 
approaches to SSR (as called for by the two SSR concepts) and benchmarks 
to measure the implementation of SSR activities, the dependence of success-
ful SSR on effective cooperation arrangements with the multitude of external 
actors that can be found in the field (from bilateral donors to international 
organisations and NGOs), and the costly political, economic and human capi-
tal implications of integrated approaches. Finding solutions to these challenges 
is of utmost importance if we take into account that the successful implemen-
tation of a coherent SSR policy requires a careful consideration of issues such 
as planning, budgeting, financial and human resources, and cooperation and 
competition among relevant actors. 
Conclusion 
Writing in 2006, Damien Helly (from Saferworld) argued that SSR would 
become in the foreseeable future a crucial component in the implemen-
tation of the EU’s defence, security, development, and crisis management 
and conflict prevention policies since it represented a “formidable tool 
to engage in groundbreaking initiatives worldwide” and in a variety of 
scenarios.39 He also delved into the reasons that made the EU an ideal 
candidate as a SSR advocate, including its donor status, its flexible and 
enduring presence in many countries, and the variety of tools (political, 
developmental, security) at its disposal. 40 
Despite all existing criticisms, the Council and Commission SSR docu-
ments represent a major step forward in the development of the EU’s 
external identity. The approach described in these documents, underlined 
by the principles of adherence to democratic norms and internation-
ally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, respect for 
nationally/regionally owned participatory reform processes, and coordi-
nation with other areas of EU action on the basis of gender-sensitive and 
multi-sectoral reform processes, will allow the Union to respond more 
effectively to a variety of challenges, including violent conflict, poverty, 
state fragility and terrorism, to name a few. 
However, in order to turn these pledges into tangible results and take 
advantage of its strengths, the EU needs to deal with a variety of out-
standing issues, such as improving internal coordination among members 
of the EU family, and externally with a variety of actors, and the costly 
nature of the endeavour. The process did not start well, as illustrated 
by the drafting of a common policy framework instead of a single SSR 
concept. However, given that this new EU policy is still in its early imple-
mentation stages, it is too early to predict where it will go. 
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Notes
1. Different actors use variations of the term interchangeably. Whereas the development community 
tends to opt for “security sector reform”, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
prefers the term “security system reform”, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) supports 
the phrase “justice and security sector reform”. Security Sector Governance and Security Sector 
Transformation (often equated with African discourses) are other possible alternatives. This chapter 
has opted for the term “Security Sector Reform” as it is the most commonly used among scholars 
and practitioners. For a more detailed explanation of the existing terminology see Michael Brzoska, 
Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, Occasional Paper no. 4, Geneva: 
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